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Non-Technical Summary
The United States (U.S.) is the last major economy to impose repatriation taxes on
international FDI activities. If earnings from foreign subsidiaries are repatriated, the
U.S. taxes the dividend at the domestic corporate tax rate of 35% (plus state taxes),
while granting a tax credit for foreign taxes already paid on the profits underlying the
dividends (tax credit system). In contrast, all other important economies refrain from
imposing such taxes (exemption system).
Repatriation taxes to be paid on a target's profits following international mergers and
acquisitions reduce the discounted future cash flows to the investor, which results in a
lower valuation of the target and a lower bid price compared to an identical investor from
an exemption country. Investors from the U.S. should thus less frequently succeed in
acquiring targets. In this paper, we empirically investigate if a foreign tax credit system
indeed impedes foreign acquisitions and quantify the implied loss in efficiency.
In 2009, the U.K. and Japan switched from credit to exemption. This is the first time
that two major capital exporting economies fundamentally changed their international
taxation regimes, which provides us with a very promising quasi-natural experiment to
identify the effect of repatriation taxes on international mergers and acquisitions.
We analyze a large sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions with acquirers
from 20 OECD member states in the period from 2004 to 2010. For every target firm,
we estimate the probability to observe an acquirer from each of the eventual acquirer-
countries in order to infer how the probability to observe an acquirer from the U.K. and
Japan changed due to the introduction of the exemption system.
We find empirical evidence for repatriation taxes reducing the competitiveness of in-
vestors from tax credit countries in the international market for corporate control. The
economic importance of this effect depends on the level of the domestic profit tax rate
in place. The larger the domestic profit tax rate, the larger the repatriation taxes due.
Since the Japanese profit tax rate (40.69%) in 2009 is higher than the U.K. profit tax rate
(28%), the reform effect is more pronounced for Japan than for the U.K. We estimate
the Japanese 2009 abolishment of the tax credit system to have increased the number
of international mergers and acquisitions with a Japanese acquirer by 31.9%. The esti-
mated effect for the U.K. is only 3.9%. We finally simulate a U.S. switch from credit to
exemption. According to our results, such a reform of the U.S. international tax system
would increase the number of international mergers and acquisitions with U.S. acquirers
by 17.1%.
Das Wichtigste in Kürze
Die USA sind das letzte Land, das noch Repatriierungssteuern auf ausländische Direkt-
investitionen erhebt. Werden Gewinne einer ausländischen Tochtergesellschaft an die
Muttergesellschaft ausgeschüttet, besteuern die USA diese Dividenden mit 35% (zzgl.
Staatssteuern). Bereits im Ausland gezahlte Steuern auf die den Dividenden zugrunde
liegenden Gewinne werden dabei angerechnet (Anrechnungsverfahren). In allen anderen
großen Volkswirtschaften sind solche Dividendenzahlungen von zusätzlicher Besteuerung
befreit (Freistellungsverfahren).
Mögliche Repatriierungssteuern auf Gewinne einer Zielgesellschaft nach einer grenz-
überschreitenden Unternehmensübernahme verringern den Barwert der erwarteten zu-
künftigen Nettogewinne für den potentiellen Erwerber. Diese niedrigere Bewertung der
Zielgesellschaft führt verglichen mit einem sonst gleichen Mitbewerber aus einem Frei-
stellungsland zu einer geringeren Zahlungsbereitschaft des US-Investors, der dadurch bei
Bieterverfahren um attraktive Zielgesellschaften seltener zum Zuge kommen dürfte. In
der vorliegenden Studie wird empirisch untersucht, inwiefern das Anrechnungsverfahren
tatsächlich Unternehmensübernahmen im Ausland behindert und der damit verbundene
Effizienzverlust abgeschätzt.
Mit Großbritannien und Japan haben im Jahr 2009 erstmals zwei große Kapital ex-
portierende Volkswirtschaften ihr internationales Besteuerungssystem fundamental geän-
dert und das Anrechnungsverfahren durch das Freistellungsverfahren ersetzt. Diese Re-
formen erlauben es, den Effekt von Repatriierungssteuern auf die internationale Übernah-
meaktivität in einem quasi-natürlichen Experiment zu untersuchen.
Die vorliegende Studie analysiert grenzüberschreitende Übernahmen im Zeitraum 2004
bis 2010 mit Erwerbergesellschaften in 20 OECD-Ländern. Dabei wird für jedes Zielun-
ternehmen und für jedes potentielle Erwerberland die Wahrscheinlichkeit geschätzt, einen
Erwerber aus dem jeweiligen Land zu beobachten, um Rückschlüsse darüber zu ziehen, wie
sich die Wahrscheinlichkeit einen Erwerber aus Großbritannien bzw. Japan zu beobachten
durch die Einführung des Freistellungsverfahrens geändert hat.
Die empirische Analyse bestätigt, dass Repatriierungssteuern die Wettbewerbsfähigkeit
im Bieterverfahren um ausländische Zielgesellschaften verringern. Die ökonomische Rele-
vanz hängt vom Steuersatz im jeweiligen potentiellen Erwerberland ab. Da der japanische
Gewinnsteuersatz im Jahr 2009 (40,69%) höher war als der Britische (28%), ergibt sich
auch ein stärkerer Reformeffekt für Japan. Gemäß den Simulationen in der vorliegenden
Studie hat die Abschaffung des Anrechnungsverfahrens die Zahl der grenzüberschreit-
enden Übernahmen mit japanischen Erwerbern um 31,9% erhöht. Für Großbritannien
ergibt sich eine Steigerung um 3,9%. Eine analoge Simulation einer hypotetischen Reform
in den USA führt zu einem Anstieg der Übernahmezahl mit US-Erwerber um 17,1%.
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simulated to increase the number of U.S. cross-border acquisition by 17.1%. We estimate
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and 13.5 million dollar due to the U.K. reform. Simulating such a reform for the U.S.
results in a yearly efficiency gain of 1134 million dollar.
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1 Introduction
"No one is satisfied with the U.S. corporate tax system. Some argue (...) But
others say, the main problem is that the United States has a higher corporate
tax rate than any other major country and, unlike other countries, imposes
severe taxes on income earned outside its borders. This, they argue, unfairly
burdens companies engaged in international competition and discourages the
repatriation of profits earned abroad." (Lawrence Summers in the Washington
Post July 7th, 2013).
This paper analyzes a particular aspect in which tax systems may distort the interna-
tional competition between firms: the effect of repatriation taxes on international mergers
and acquisitions. When profits from foreign subsidiaries are repatriated by a United States
(U.S.) corporate parent, the U.S. taxes the dividend at the domestic corporation tax rate
of 35 % (plus state taxes), while crediting the foreign taxes already paid on the repatri-
ated profits (foreign dividend tax credit system). In contrast, all other major developed
countries generally exempt dividends received by the parent from foreign subsidiaries from
taxation (dividend exemption system).
Repatriation taxes to be paid on a target's profits following international mergers and
acquisitions reduce the discounted future cash flows to the investor, which results in a
lower valuation of the target. Ceteris paribus, due to repatriation taxes, the bid price
of U.S. investors is relatively lower than that of an identical investor from an exemption
country. Investors from the U.S. should thus less frequently succeed in acquiring targets.
Put differently, the U.S. corporate tax system may "unfairly burden companies engaged in
international competition" for corporate control. In this paper, we empirically investigate
if a foreign tax credit system indeed impedes foreign acquisitions and we quantify the
implied loss in efficiency.
This is a particularly relevant issue given the important role that cross-border mergers
and acquisitions play for foreign direct investment (FDI) especially between developed
economies. In 2011, their value increased by 53 % to $ 526 billion and the implied
loss in efficiency due to distortions in the market for corporate control may therefore be
correspondingly huge.
In 2009, the United Kingdom (U.K.) and Japan switched from a tax credit system to
an exemption system. This is the first time that two major capital exporting economies
fundamentally changed their international taxation regimes  an event, which allows
us to directly identify the regimes' effect on international mergers and acquisitions. In
contrast, previous empirical identification strategies had to rely on indirect changes in
double taxation due to variations of withholding taxes or corporate tax rates in either
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the capital exporting or capital importing country. With such an indirect approach, it is
possible that the observed effect of double taxation is actually an artifact which should
instead be attributed to the underlying changes themselves  for example, the fact that
a tax treaty has been concluded or that the corporate income tax rate has changed.
We consider a large sample of cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the period
from 2004 to 2010. For every target firm, we analyze the origin of the eventual acquirer
by estimating conditional logit models, nested logit models, and simulated maximum
likelihood models. The treatment group in the sample is represented by the acquirer
countries, which switch from a foreign tax credit regime to an exemption regime, while
the strength of the treatment is moderated by the tax rate differentials between acquirer
and target countries.
We find that repatriation taxes reduce the competitiveness of investors from tax credit
countries in the international market for corporate control. The size of this effect is
conditional on the acquirer's tax rate relative to the the rest of the world: the larger
the home country's corporate income tax rate, the larger the repatriation taxes due.
Accordingly, the effect of the reform is more pronounced for Japan than for the U.K.
because the Japanese tax rate of 40.69% is higher in 2009 than the British tax rate of
28%. We estimate the abolishment of the tax credit system in Japan to have increased the
number of international mergers and acquisitions with a Japanese acquirer by 31.9%. The
estimated effect for the U.K. is only 3.9%. We finally simulate a switch in the U.S. from
a credit to an exemption regime, which implies an increase in the number of international
mergers and acquisitions with U.S. acquirers by 17.1%.
The empirical results are relevant for the ongoing discussion on the U.S. corporate tax
system as well as for the scientific discussion on the design of international tax systems.
The seminal paper by Musgrave (1969) argues that a foreign tax credit system is optimal
from a global perspective because it establishes production efficiency by means of capital
export neutrality. On the other hand, Desai and Hines (2003) and Becker and Fuest
(2010) develop the counterargument that ownership neutrality may be more relevant for
efficiency in a world in which FDI takes place mainly by means of mergers and acquisi-
tions and not by means of greenfield investment. In this case, repatriation taxes distort
production efficiency as they distort ownership structures in favor of parent firms, which
are not subject to these kind of taxes. Ownership advantages (e.g. expected synergies)
are therefore not optimally exploited.
Based on these arguments, Griffith et al. (2010) recommend the abolishment of foreign
tax credits in the U.K. in favor of exempting dividends to improve the competitiveness
of U.K.-based multinational companies in the international market for corporate control.
The controversial discussion of the two systems of double taxation relief with respect
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to neutrality properties would be rather moot if the two systems - as they are actually
put in practice - resulted in identical empirical patterns. However, our results confirm
that ownership structures are indeed distorted by asymmetries in international taxation,
as a policy switch from credit to exemption does increase the amount of acquisitions
abroad. With respect to distortions of ownership neutrality, we estimate the yearly gain
in efficiency in the form of additional synergies raised to be in the order of 525 million
dollar for the Japanese tax reform and 13.5 million dollar for the tax reform in the U.K.
A simulation of a policy change to an exemption system in the U.S. implies gains of 1,134
million dollar.
Several papers deal with the empirical effects of international taxation on FDI in gen-
eral (see e.g. Slemrod (1990), Swenson (1994), Hines (1996), Gropp and Kostial (2000),
Bénassy-Quéré et al. (2005) and Hajkova et al. (2006)). However, the empirical literature
on the effect of international taxation on mergers and acquisitions is scarce. Di Giovanni
(2005), Herger et al. (2011) and Arulampalam et al. (2012) consider the effect of host
country corporate taxation. Huizinga and Voget (2009) additionally include withholding
taxes in their analysis, while Barrios et al. (2012) consider the establishment of new
foreign subsidiaries. In contrast to the previous literature, we directly identify the effect
of a systematic change in international taxation. Furthermore, instead of analyzing the
choice of location for investment, we focus on the location of the investor, as our ultimate
interest is in the loss of efficiency due to violations of ownership neutrality.
In the following, section 2 describes the tax treatment of foreign source dividends within
multinational firms, and it presents the empirical framework for estimating the effect of
this international tax on the location of the investor in deals. Section 3 describes the data
and the control variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results and section 5 concludes.
2 International Taxation and the Valuation of Firms
In line with the recommendations of the OECD model tax treaty, cross-border dividend
repatriations from foreign subsidiaries to their corporate parent within the OECD are gen-
erally governed by one of two methods of double taxation relief: either the dividends are
exempted from further taxation at the level of the corporate parent (exemption system) or
the repatriated dividends are subject to the corporate income tax in the parent's country
while receiving a tax credit for taxes already paid abroad (foreign tax credit system). This
additional tax burden on repatriated dividends may put acquirers from countries with a
foreign credit system at a disadvantage when bidding for foreign corporations, specifically
in low tax locations because the additional tax is inversely related to the target firm's
corporate income tax. The unique feature in our period of observation is the policy switch
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of two major capital exporting countries - Japan and the U.K. - from a foreign tax credit
system to an exemption system in 2009.3 Accordingly, the empirical analysis is particu-
larly designed to isolate the effect of this policy change from other developments in the
tax system. Furthermore, even country-specific reactions to the financial crisis should not
affect our estimation results, as the proposed identification strategy relies on changes at
the bilateral level.
2.1 Empirical Model
Following Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) and Becker and Fuest (2010), let us assume that
takeovers reflect the synergies from combining two firms and that all assets are priced at
fair value. Let
Vijk = αTij + β
>xijk + ijk (1)
be the value of firm k in country j if it was owned by an investor from country i.4 The
term Tij captures the cost of additional taxation to be paid when dividends are repatriated
from country j to country i. The variable vector xijk and the error term ijk represent
other observable and unobservable factors, which capture the general size of firm k's
profits as well as ownership-specific synergies which are realized by combining firm k with
a particular investor.5 Country-specific and time-specific effects are accounted for by
means of dummy variables. The error term ijk follows an extreme value distribution as
seen in McFadden (1974), and the coefficients α and β are parameters to be estimated.
A given target firm will be acquired by an investor from country i if the corresponding
reservation price is higher than for any other acquirer,
Vijk ≥ Vhjk, ∀h ∈ (1, ..., I) (2)
the probability of which is given by6
P (Vijk ≥ Vhjk|T1jk,x1jk, ..., TIjk,xIjk) = exp(αTij + β
>xijk)∑I
l=1 exp(αTlj + β
>xljk)
∀h, (3)
3New Zealand also switched to an exemption system in 2009. In the interest of brevity, we will focus
our discussion on the cases of Japan and the U.K.
4A subscript t indicating the time-period is suppressed.
5Arulampalam et al. (2012) give an example, in which labeling goods with a well-known brand allows
the firm to raise prices resulting in larger profits. In Jensen and Ruback (1983) and Palepu (1986),
more efficient management increases the target firm's value.
6The probability is conditional on the takeover being profitable for at least one acquirer. We expect
this condition to be independent of P (Vijk ≥ Vhjk).
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where I indicates the number of potential acquirer countries.7 The parameters α and β
can then be estimated by a conditional logit regression in a sample of deals. A negative
value for α would be in line with the conjecture of Desai and Hines (2003), that firms
subject to repatriation taxes are at a disadvantage when bidding for foreign firms. While
the conditional logit model is conceptually straightforward, estimates may be biased if the
independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption is violated. Alternatively, mixed logit
regressions and nested logit regressions are therefore applied as specified in robustness
checks of the empirical analysis.
2.2 Identification Strategy
The first, most parsimonious approach analyzes the policy change as a treatment effect:
countries with a foreign tax credit system apply the treatment (i.e. additional taxes)
to dividends from sources with a lower tax level, in which case the treatment dummy
variable takes the value one.8 The treatment is abolished by starting to exempt foreign-
source dividends from taxation. Unobserved factors are controlled for by country-fixed
effects and time-fixed effects.9 Specifically, the variable of interest is constructed as
T dummyij =
1, if τi > τj and country i applies foreign tax credit system0, otherwise, (4)
where τj is the corporate income tax rate in the subsidiary's country j and τi the tax rate
in the parent's country i. However, the parsimony of this approach comes at the cost
of precision because the treatment is assumed to be homogenous. In a second step, the
heterogeneity of the treatment is therefore taken into account by using the tax differential
between host and home country as a measure for the dose of the treatment - the size of
repatriation taxes:
T∆ij =
τi − τj, if τi > τj and country i applies foreign tax credit system0, otherwise. (5)
7For the current research question, it is sufficient to analyze the matching of target firms with acquiring
countries instead of the matching of target firms with particular acquiring firms  for which it
would be challenging to construct an appropriate choice set. Variations in the number of potential
acquiring firms across countries are subsumed in country-specific effects, which are accounted for in
all regressions.
8Foreign tax credits are always limited such that the tax on the repatriated dividends cannot become
negative when corporate income taxes are higher in the subsidiary's country than in the parent's
country.
9Time-fixed effects simply cancel out in this estimation framework as they apply equally to all potential
acquirers of a target firm.
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If this repatriation tax handicaps the acquisition of foreign firms, one should find a neg-
ative effect when estimating its coefficient in expression (3). Some countries do not fully
exempt foreign-source dividends. A certain percentage of the dividends may be deemed
to be non-deductible expenses and be added to the parent's taxable income, leading to
a repatriation tax burden. Moving further away from the treatment effect design, the
measure of repatriation taxes can therefore be refined in a third step by also taking into
account that some countries such as Germany or France do not fully exempt foreign-source
dividends. Instead, usually 5% of foreign-source dividends remain subject to corporate
income taxes, such that the variable of interest is defined as
T∆2ij =

τi − τj, if τi > τj and country i applies foreign tax credit system
(1− τj)xτi, if country i exempts only a share of (1-x )
0, otherwise.
(6)
The above measure accounts only for the tax on dividends imposed by the parent country.
The subsidiary's country, however, may impose additional withholding taxes on dividends.
Though withholding taxes are creditable foreign taxes, these additional taxes may cause an
excess credit situation and the overall double tax on dividend repatriations may increase.
If the subsidiary's country levies withholding taxes on dividends, the compound double
tax is calculated as10
T∆3ij =

max[τi − τj, (1− τj)ωij], if country i applies foreign
tax credit system
(1− τj)ωij + (1− τj)(1− ωij)xτi, if country i exempts
only a share of (1-x )
(1− τj)ωij, otherwise,
(7)
where ωij is the applicable withholding tax rate for dividend payments from a subsidiary
in country j to its parent in country i. Foreign corporation tax is difficult to avoid even if
dividends are eventually repatriated via third countries (e.g. by interposing a foreign con-
duit company). Dividend routing, however, matters in case of withholding taxes. These
taxes may be reduced significantly or even avoided if received by the parent via interposed
foreign companies. In line with this, Barrios et al. (2012) find that the establishment
of new foreign subsidiaries does not appear to be affected by withholding taxes, which
could be attributed to the use of conduit companies.11 This potential difference in effect
10See Huizinga and Voget (2009) or Barrios et al. (2012) for comparison.
11For example, Mintz and Weichenrieder (2010) provide evidence that high withholding tax rates tend
to be avoided by conduit companies.
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conditional on the source of repatriation taxes is further investigated in robustness checks
of the empirical analysis.
Table 1: Tax Rates and Dividend Repatriation Taxation Systems
Tax Rate System
Acquirer country 2004 2010 2004 2010
Australia 0.30 0.30 E E
Austria 0.34 0.25 E E
Belgium 0.34 0.34 E95 E95
Canada 0.34 0.31 E E
Denmark 0.30 0.25 E E
Germany 0.36 0.29 E95 E95
Finland 0.29 0.26 E E
France 0.34 0.33 E95 E95
Ireland 0.13 0.13 C C
Italy 0.37 0.31 E95 E95
Japan 0.42 0.41 C E95
Luxembourg 0.30 0.29 E E
Netherlands 0.35 0.26 E E
New Zealand 0.33 0.30 C E
Norway 0.28 0.28 E E97
Spain 0.35 0.30 E E
Sweden 0.28 0.26 E E
Switzerland 0.24 0.21 E E
United Kingdom 0.30 0.28 C E
United States 0.39 0.39 C C
C: credit, E: exemption, E95: 95% exemption, E97: 97% exemption
2004:
Australia applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile, Estonia, Greece,
Island, Israel, Luxembourg, Portugal and Turkey. Canada applied the tax credit system
for subsidiaries located in Greece and Turkey. Spain applied the tax credit system for sub-
sidiaries located in New Zealand and Finland applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries
located in Chile.
2010:
Canada applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Greece and Turkey. Finland
applied the tax credit system for subsidiaries located in Chile.
Other features of international taxation cannot be explicitly accounted for because it
would require speculative assumptions  not only about the actual acquirer but also
about its contenders  with respect to their international structure and the timing of
repatriations. For example, the repatriation tax may be deferred until the foreign profits
are distributed reducing the effective repatriation tax burden. This is implicitly taken into
account as it attenuates the estimated coefficient of the statutory double tax measure.
Similarly, acquirers may find the potential double tax less relevant if they are in a position
of having excess foreign tax credits due to a pre-existing large share of business in high-
tax countries. Again, this would be reflected in attenuated coefficient estimates of the
statutory double tax measure.
Table 1 summarizes the prevalent method of double tax relief for the potential acquirer
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locations at the beginning and at the end of our sample period. The U.S. is currently
the only country left, which still applies a foreign tax credit system, apart from Ireland,
where the method of double tax relief is practically irrelevant due to the low Irish cor-
porate income tax rate of 12.5%. In Japan the foreign tax credit system was replaced
by an exemption system in 2009. The reform was first announced in December 2008 and
the legislation passed on March 27, 2009. Since April 1, 2009, dividends received have
generally been exempt, although 5% of repatriated profits are still subject to Japanese
corporate income taxes as they are deemed to be non-deductible expenses.12 Similarly,
the U.K. started to exempt dividends from July 1, 2009. The first proposal was made in
June 2007. In July 2008, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury wrote an open letter in
which he announced a possible dividend exemption. In December 2008, a draft for dis-
cussion was made.13 In addition, New Zealand replaced its foreign tax credit system with
an exemption system on January 1, 2009.14 General or country-specific shocks around
2009 should not interfere with the previously described identification strategy because the
existence and the magnitude of the abolished tax treatment varies at a bilateral level.
3 Data Description
From the Zephyr Bureau van Dijk database, we collect all cross-border corporate deals
between OECD countries in the 2004-2010 period, through which majority control of the
target firm has been attained.15 To keep the mixed logit regressions computationally
feasible, the set of acquiring countries considered is restricted to the twenty most frequent
acquirer locations. This renders a sample of 12597 deals. Table 5 in the Appendix lists the
number of acquirers by country of origin over time, while Figure 1 illustrates the spatial
distribution of acquirer locations. The variation in the total number of deals over time
reflects the cyclical nature of mergers and acquisitions activity, which generally follows the
trends in stock markets: the number of deals peaked in 2007 and fell thereafter. In 2010,
the number of deals recovered to the level at which it had started in 2004. These general
developments  even if country-specific  should not distort the estimation results as
the proposed identification strategy relies on changes at a bilateral level. In line with the
findings by Di Giovanni (2005), countries with large stock markets such as the U.S. and
the U.K. also exhibit the largest number of acquirers.
Variable definitions and data sources are listed in Table 6 in the Appendix. Table 7 in
12See Smith et al. (2009), Ernst & Young (2011), p. 562, Carr et al. (2009) and Gutiérrez at al. (2011),
p. 553 - 554.
13See House of Lords (2009), Ernst & Young (2011), p. 1179, Carr et al. (2009) and Gutiérrez at al.
(2011).
14See Ernst & Young (2011), p. 789 - 790 and Gutiérrez at al. (2011), p. 759.
15Deals without a uniquely determined acquirer or target are excluded.
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Figure 1: Spatial distribution of acquirers
the Appendix provides summary statistics for the control variables used in the empirical
work. At the level of the acquirer country, the corporate income tax rate, τi, controls for
shocks to the parent firm's investment, which serves as a common input in a multinational
production process. For example, Becker and Riedel (2012) find a negative effect of parent
country tax rates on foreign affiliate investment. The gross domestic product per capita,
GDPCi, and the gross domestic product growth rate, GDPGi, may have a positive
effect, reflecting differences in productivity across potential acquirers. Good financing
conditions as proxied by a country's stock market capitalization relative to GDP, Stocki,
should increase the likelihood of a successful bid. Furthermore, a strong exchange rate,
Exchi, may facilitate foreign acquisitions (Blonigen (1997)). The variables GDPSki and
Dealski capture the specialisation of acquirer countries in particular industries. GDPSki
measures the share of the target's industry sector in the GDP of the acquiring country
one year prior to the deal, whereas Dealski counts how many cross-border deals in the
target firm's industry originated from the acquirer country over the preceding 5 years.
Several variables such as distance, Distij, and indicators for common borders, Neighbij,
common languages, Langij, former colonial relationships Colonyij, and formerly having
been part of the same nation, Sameij, control for bilateral variation in transaction costs
9
which increase with the cultural and geographic distance between countries. These control
variables were also found to be relevant for cross-border mergers and acquisitions by Di
Giovanni (2005).
4 Empirical Results
Table 2 presents the results of multinomial choice regressions explaining the acquirer's
country of origin in the previously described sample. For every deal, the dependent vari-
able equals one for the actual acquirer's country of origin and zero for the counterfactual
acquirer locations. In the conditional logit regression (1), the variable of interest is the
parsimonious treatment dummy, T dummyij , defined in expression (4), which indicates an
additional tax on dividend repatriations due to insufficient foreign tax credits. The neg-
ative coefficient implies that the switch to an exemption system by Japan and the U.K.
facilitates successful bids for target firms in countries with relatively lower tax rates.
A heterogenous treatment effect is allowed for in regression (2), as the variable of
interest T∆ij , defined in expression (5), measures the size of potential repatriation taxes
on dividends. Again, the coefficient is found to be negative, although its p-value is now
substantially smaller than in regression (1). The higher significance is most probably due
to removing the assumption of homogenous repatriation taxes.
Following Cameron and Trivedi (2009, p. 502), the economic effect implied by regres-
sion (2) is estimated by the change in predicted probabilities, as the variable of inter-
est is perturbed while keeping all other variables constant. In particular, we simulate
the counterfactual that the U.K. had not exempted foreign-source dividends from tax-
ation in 2009 and 2010. Table 3 lists the average predicted probabilities of harboring
the successful acquirer in a cross-border deal based on the actual variables in column
(1), and based on the simulated variables in column (2). The comparison implies that
the switch to an exemption system has increased British acquisitions abroad by 3.9%
(= (0.1581 − 0.1522)/0.1522) or by 1.8 billion U.S. dollar in terms of yearly volume.
Along the same lines, we simulate that Japan had not introduced an exemption system
in 2009. The corresponding predicted probabilities for the actual and the counterfactual
situation in columns (1) and (3) imply that Japanese acquisitions abroad have increased
by 31.9% or by 4.1 billion U.S. dollar in terms of yearly volume. The more pronounced
effect is due to the Japanese corporate income tax rate of 40.7% being considerably higher
than the British corporate income tax rate of 28%. Hence, the abolished potential double
taxation of Japanese dividend repatriations was larger and occured in more cases than
for British repatriations. In fact, the Japanese tax rate is the maximum tax rate through
the whole sample period. Inspired by the discussion in the U.S. for a reform of foreign
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Table 2: Regression estimates
Conditional logit Mixed logit
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
T dummyij -0.1210*
(0.052)
T∆ij -2.7896*** -2.7111*** -2.7111*** -2.7111** -2.7111***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.009) (0.017) (0.000)
τi -1.7916** -1.4887* -1.8587** -1.8587 -1.8587* -1.8587
(0.021) (0.057) (0.032) (0.155) (0.055) (0.207)
GDPCi 0.0520** 0.0513** 0.0526** 0.0526* 0.0526** 0.0526*
(0.018) (0.019) (0.022) (0.090) (0.035) (0.072)
GDPGi 0.0719*** 0.0732*** 0.0754*** 0.0754*** 0.0754*** 0.0754***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Stocki 0.0022*** 0.0020** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021** 0.0021*
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.045) (0.040) (0.088)
Exchi -0.0091 -0.0040 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0044 -0.0044
(0.188) (0.547) (0.510) (0.565) (0.541) (0.562)
GDPSki 0.0081*** 0.0082*** 0.0081*** 0.0081*** 0.0081** 0.0081**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.032) (0.026)
Dealski 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0002***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Distij -0.5375*** -0.5213*** -0.5316*** -0.5316*** -0.5316*** -0.5316***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Neighbij 0.2541*** 0.2746*** 0.3204*** 0.3204*** 0.3204*** 0.3204***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)
Langij 0.7547*** 0.7761*** 0.8284*** 0.8284*** 0.8284*** 0.8284***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Colonyij 0.3816*** 0.3487*** 0.3587*** 0.3587*** 0.3587*** 0.3587***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Sameij 0.6123*** 0.6100*** 0.8181*** 0.8181*** 0.8181*** 0.8181***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 240364 240364 240364 240364 240364 240364
Log-Likelihood -27680.99 -27663.90 -27639.02 -27639.02 -27639.02 -27639.02
Notes: the dependent variable equals one if country i is the actual acquirer's country of origin. It is zero
if country i is a counterfactual acquirer location. Regression (1) and (2) are conditional logit regressions,
while regressions (3) to (6) are mixed logit regressions. All regressions control for acquirer country specific
effects, which follow a random distribution in the mixed logit regressions. The parameter estimates for
the acquirer country-specific estimates in the mixed logit regressions are shown in Table 8. Regressions
(4) to (6) are identical to regression (3) except for standard errors, which are robust to clustering on
the target-country/year level, target-country/industry level and the industry/year level, respectively. p-
values in parentheses, ∗ denotes significance at the 10%-level, ∗∗ at the 5%-level and ∗∗∗ at the 1%-level
respectively.
corporate income taxation, we also simulate that the U.S. had exempted foreign-source
dividends in 2009 and 2010, the average predicted probabilities of which are listed in col-
umn (4). Such a policy change is calculated to increase the number of U.S. acquisitions
abroad by 17.1% or by 15.9 billion U.S. dollar in terms of yearly volume.16
16The calculation of yearly volumes is based on the acquiring country's average deal value in the sample
period 2004-2010.
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Table 3: Effect of policy change based on regression (2) of Table 2
Reforms
2009 - 2010:
Country
Actual state
2009-2010
No Reform
U.K.
2009-2010
No Reform
Japan
2009-2010
Reform U.S.
2009-2010
Australia 0.0295 0.0297 0.0297 0.0274
Austria 0.0158 0.0159 0.0159 0.0146
Belgium 0.0262 0.0264 0.0263 0.0244
Canada 0.0900 0.0902 0.0902 0.0873
Denmark 0.0232 0.0234 0.0234 0.0215
Finland 0.0220 0.0222 0.0222 0.0203
France 0.0721 0.0726 0.0725 0.0666
Germany 0.0752 0.0758 0.0756 0.0695
Ireland 0.0140 0.0141 0.0141 0.0127
Italy 0.0152 0.0154 0.0153 0.0141
Japan 0.0211 0.0212 0.0160 0.0195
Luxembourg 0.0095 0.0095 0.0095 0.0089
Netherlands 0.0639 0.0642 0.0642 0.0595
New Zealand 0.0077 0.0078 0.0078 0.0071
Norway 0.0219 0.0221 0.0220 0.0202
Spain 0.0192 0.0193 0.0193 0.0178
Sweden 0.0534 0.0538 0.0537 0.0493
Switzerland 0.0356 0.0357 0.0357 0.0331
United Kindom 0.1581 0.1522 0.1589 0.1483
United States 0.3394 0.3410 0.3411 0.3973
Numbers are relative frequencies of all deals with acquirer from the specific
country in the given period predicted based on regression (2).
Among the control variables, the likelihood of a successful bid is negatively related to
the acquirer's corporate income tax rate, τi, as shocks to investment in common input
factors at the parent level appear to decrease the value of acquisitions abroad. The positive
signs of gross domestic product per capita, GDPCi, and of the gross domestic product
growth rate, GDPGi, suggest that highly productive firms are more likely to engage in
FDI as argued by Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004). The positive effect of stock market
capitalization over GDP, Stocki, reflects the comparative advantage of acquirers with
access to well developed capital markets. The exchange rate does not show a significant
effect. Specialization in the target's industry  as measured by the relevant industry
sector share in the acquiring country's GDP, GDPSki, and the acquiring country's number
of cross-border acquisitions in the relevant industry over the preceding 5 years, Dealski
 also appears to explain the prevailing acquirer location. The significant effects of
distance, Distij, common borders, Neighbij, common languages, Langij, former colonial
relationships, Colonyij, and formerly having been part of the same nation, Sameij, suggest
the presence of bilateral transaction costs, for example, in the form of cultural frictions
or information costs.
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The conditional logit regressions may be inconsistent if the assumption of independence
of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is violated. We test the IIA assumption by a series of 20
Hausman tests, in which one country at a time is excluded from the choice set. In half
of the cases, the estimates based on the reduced samples differ significantly from the
full sample estimates, which casts doubt upon the validity of the IIA assumption. On
the other hand, Cheng and Long (2006) argue that tests of the IIA assumption based
on restricted choice sets perform very poorly even in large samples. Nevertheless, the
IIA assumption appears to be rather strong from a theoretical perspective, for example,
if acquirer countries' industrial specialisations cannot be sufficiently controlled for by
observables: a manufacturing firm, may be more likely to be acquired by a German firm,
whereas a target financial firm may be more likely to be acquired from the U.K. or from
the U.S. One set of acquirer-country fixed effects for the whole sample would therefore
be too restrictive, as the effects should vary across industries. Similarly, regional markets
may integrate at different speeds than the global market and a target may be more likely
(or less likely) to be acquired from a country within the same regional market than from
overseas. In both cases the IIA assumption is violated. Allowing for a larger number of
fixed effects  acquirer-country by industry, acquirer-country by target-country or even
a combination of the two  by means of dummy variables is not a viable approach as the
large number of parameters would result in an incidental parameter bias (Greene (2012),
p. 659-661).
Instead, a mixed logit estimator (Train (2009), p. 138) is applied in regression (3) of
Table 2, in which the vector of coefficients for the country-specific effects γ is allowed to be
random according to a normal distribution with mean g and covariance W . Parameters
are estimated by simulated maximum likelihood with 50 Halton draws. The estimated
standard deviations of the normal distribution are highly significant indicating that this
approach should be preferred to the conditional logit regression. Therefore, we stick
to mixed logit regressions for most of the remaining analysis. Eventually, this choice is
immaterial because the basic implications remain similar: the coefficient of the variable of
interest, Tax∆ij , remains significantly negative in regression (3). As previously conducted,
we simulate counterfactual policies in the U.K., Japan, and the U.S. for taxing foreign-
source dividends in the period 2009-2010. The change in average predicted probabilities
suggests that exempting dividends has increased  or, in the case of the U.S., would
have increased  the number of acquisitions abroad by 3.7% for the U.K., by 30.4% for
Japan, and 16.2% for the U.S. Regressions (4) through (6) are similar to regression (3),
but standard errors are now robust to clustering at the level of the target-country/year
pairs (regression (4)), at the level of target-country/industry pairs (regression (5)) and
at the level of industry/year pairs (regression (6)). The level of significance is hardly
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sensitive to the choice of clustering. The same result is found when errors are simply
clustered by industry.
As mentioned before, the unique feature in our data is the policy switch of two major
capital exporting countries - Japan and the U.K. - from a foreign tax credit system to an
exemption system. However, tax rates varied between 2004 and 2010, which also affects
our repatriation tax measure T∆ij . In regression (1) of Table 4, we therefore rely solely on
regime changes for identification by calculating repatriation taxes with tax rates fixed to
their values in 2008, one year prior to the British and Japanese reforms. The estimates
remain similar, which confirms that the effect is indeed identified by the changes in the
method of double tax relief and not by variations in the underlying corporate income tax
rates.
Acquisition behavior may have already adjusted in the run-up to the effective change
in policy if agents started to anticipate the eventual introduction of an exemption system.
Therefore, regression (2) of Table 4 excludes all observations from 2008, the year prior to
the reforms, without much change in the results.
Profitable target firms may indeed be bought for the future profits they promise while
loss-making firms may be bought for strategic reasons such as removing the threat of a
potential future competitor or acquiring a common input factor. The former group of
acquisitions could be more affected by taxes on dividend repatriations than the latter
group. This hypothesis is tested in regression (3) of Table 4 by allowing the coefficient of
T∆ij to differ between the two groups. Indeed, repatriation taxes appear to have a stronger
effect in case of profitable target firms than in case of loss-making target firms. The
difference in the coefficients is significant at a p-value of 0.0543.17
Regression (4) of Table 4 controls for further heterogeneity in target firms by allowing
the propensity to be acquired by a particular country to vary conditional on target-
specific controls (total assets and profitability). The coefficient for repatriation taxes
remains significant and increases in size. Table 9 lists the coefficients of the target-specific
variables per acquirer location except for the U.S., which serves as the country of reference.
Interestingly, the coefficients for target profitability are significantly positive for quite a
number of acquirer locations, but never significantly negative. This pattern implies that
the probability of a U.S. acquirer decreases in the target firm's profitability, which may
reflect that highly profitable firms are relatively less valuable to U.S. acquirers due to
repatriation taxes  in line with the findings of the previous robustness check, where
the acquisition of profitable targets was more affected by repatriation taxes than the
acquisition of loss-making firms.
17Correspondingly, a one-sided test for a more negative coefficient in case of profitable firms would have
a p-value of 0.0271.
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Figure 2: Kernel density of simulated coefficients of T∆ij
The figure shows the kernel distribution of simulated coefficients of T∆ij in specification (5)
of Table 4 using the method described by Train (2009, p.256) with 50 Halton draws. The
mean of the simulated coefficients is -3.99, the standard deviation is 1.28. The bandwidth
for the kernel density is 0.13.
Instead of modeling the source of heterogeneity explicitly, regression (5) of Table 4
accounts for different sensitivity to double taxation by also allowing the coefficient of
T∆ij to be randomly distributed. With a value of -3.99, the average coefficient is more
negative than in the previous regressions. Specific values of the coefficients per target firm
can be simulated as in Train (2009, p.256). Figure 2 displays a kernel density estimate
of these simulated coefficients. In line with the previous robustness checks investigating
the relationship between double taxation and target profitability, there is a significant
difference in target profitability when the sample is split at the median of the simulated
coefficients of T∆ij . Observations with more negative coefficients have an average profits-
to-assets ratio of 4.1% whereas observations with less negative coefficients have an average
profits-to-assets ratio of 2.8%.18
18Extreme outliers of profit-to-assets ratios below -1 or above 1 were disregarded. Otherwise the sample
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Regression (6) of Table 4 departs from the treatment effect design by using the repatria-
tion tax measure T∆2ij defined by expression (6) on p. 6, which also accounts for repatriation
taxes due to incomplete exemption of dividends as some countries exempt only 95 or 97%
of repatriated dividends from taxation. The estimated coefficients are very similar to
previous results.
The measure T∆2ij in expression (6) accounts only for the tax on dividends imposed by
the parent country. This tax is difficult to avoid even if dividends are eventually repatri-
ated via third countries. The overall double tax on dividend repatriations T∆3ij defined by
expression (7) can be larger if the subsidiary's country imposes withholding taxes, which
a multinational may or may not be able to circumvent by means of conduit companies.
In regression (7) of Table 4, the coefficient for T∆3ij is considerably attenuated compared
to previous estimates and it is no longer significant, which suggests that withholding
taxes may have a different effect than taxes imposed by the parent firm's country. This
hypothesis is explicitly investigated in regression (8) of Table 4 by including
Withholdingij = T
∆3
ij − T∆2ij (8)
as a separate variable, which captures the potential additional tax burden due to with-
holding taxes, while T∆2ij controls for taxes imposed by the parent firm's country. The
two coefficients are found to be significantly different with a p-value of less than 0.01.
The negative coefficient of T∆2ij is similar to previous estimates while the insignificant
coefficient of Withholdingij with a point estimate close to zero suggests that withholding
taxes can be avoided at low cost. This result is similar to the finding of Barrios et al.
(2012) that the establishment of new foreign subsidiaries does not appear to be affected
by withholding taxes.
The nested logit regression (9) in Table 4 is an alternative to the mixed logit approach,
which is also robust to violations of the IIA assumption. As a generalization of the
conditional logit regression, it allows for a two-level choice process: at the first level a
preferred subset of choices is determined, while the specific choice is picked at the second
level from within the subset.19 However, some structure has to be imposed ex-ante by
defining the relevant subsets of choices. In the current setting, a geographic grouping of
potential acquirer countries appears most sensible. In particular, we distinguish between
acquirers from Asia/Australasia, from Europe, and from North-America. As before, T∆ij
has a signifcantly negative effect.
The results above show that taxes on dividend repatriations distort cross-border own-
ership patterns. As the additional tax burden differs between acquirer locations, one
variance would increase from 0.045 to 334 and the kurtosis would increase from 7.9 to 4553.
19See, for example, Greene (2012), p. 808-810, for more details.
18
expects the observed ownership structures to be inefficient. Larger synergies could be
exploited by an alternative matching of acquirers and targets.
Figure 3: Distribution of premiums paid by Japanese acquirers
The figure shows the kernel density estimate of premiums paid by Japanese acquirers for
foreign listed companies. The premium is defined as hundred times the difference between
the acquisition price and the price one day prior to the announcement of the acquisition,
divided by the latter. 24.2% of the mergers and acuisitions have a premium smaller than
12.8. The bandwidth for the kernel density is 22.0.
In order to calculate the decrease in synergies due to second-best ownership, we cut-
off the left tail of the distribution of take-over premiums offered by Japanese acquirers,
as displayed in Figure 3, such that the proportion of the left tail relative to the whole
distribution is equal to the increase in the total number of mergers and acquisitions due
to switching from a credit to an exemption system (as calculated on p. 10). At the
cut-off, the premium is 12.8 percentage points. This value is the upper bound for the loss
in synergies caused by inefficient ownership due to double taxation. This upper bound
is reached, for example, under the (polar) assumption that for all the acquisitions by
Japanese firms, the second-best bidder is never willing to pay more for a target firm than
the going market price. Hence, if all Japanese acquirers decreased their premiums offered
19
by 12.8 percentage points, then 24.2% of the acquisitions would no longer have a Japanese
acquirer. The synergies reflected in the take-over premiums of these acquisitions would
no longer be realized.20
The loss in synergies would be correspondingly smaller than this upper bound if there
exist second-best bids close to the-first best bids of the Japanese acquirers - because then
a smaller reduction in the premiums offered by Japanese acquirers would already cause
the same proportion of mergers and acquisitions to be lost.
The increase in mergers and acquisitions with Japanese acquirers due to switching to
an exemption system (estimated on p. 10) represents an average yearly deal volume of
4,100 million U.S. dollar. Hence, the yearly efficiency loss due to inefficient ownership
caused by Japanese double taxation may have been up to 525 million U.S. dollar (=12.8%
× 4,100 million U.S. dollar).
Similar calculations show the value of synergies raised to be in the order of 13.5 million
dollar per year for the case of the British international tax reform. Simulating such a
reform for the U.S. results in a yearly value of 1,134 million dollar of additional synergies.
5 Conclusion
The empirical analysis finds that multinationals from countries which impose taxes on
repatriated profits do indeed face a comparative disadvantage in acquiring foreign firms.
Japan and the U.K. both started to exempt foreign-source dividends from tax in 2009.
These reforms are found to have increased the number of foreign acquisitions by Japanese
firms by 31.9%, whereas the number of foreign acquisitions by British firms increased by
3.9%. The identification approach relies directly on policy changes in double tax relief
and not on changes in tax rates, so we can exclude that the observed effects are just an
artifact of a change in the underlying corporate income tax. The implied loss in efficiency
due to violations of ownership neutrality is sizeable: in the case of double taxation of
multinationals based in the U.S., the loss in efficiency of 1,134 million dollar per year is
in the order of 1.2% of the yearly total value of U.S. acquisitions abroad. In that sense,
one could draw the conclusion that the U.S.  as the only remaining major country still
relying on a foreign tax credit system  should follow the British and Japanese example
of exempting foreign source dividends in order to create a level playing field for competing
acquirers and thereby avoid second-best ownership structures.
However, our results should not be interpreted as suggesting that exempting dividends
from tax is a panacea for all inefficiencies which may arise in the international investment
process. First, as Becker and Fuest (2010) argue, even for mergers and acquisitions
20Andrade et al. (2001) show that synergies are almost fully reflected in take-over premiums.
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the exemption system is not optimal from a national perspective if foreign acquisitions
rely on rival input factors from the headquarters, for example, management capacity.
Foreign activities would then crowd out domestic forms of engagement. Second, the
aspect of capital export neutrality raised by Musgrave (1969) still applies to the classic
mode of FDI, in which capital is exported. Eventually, the optimal balance between
ownership neutrality and capital export neutrality should depend on the relative share of
greenfield investment versus mergers and acquisitions in FDI. The alternative option of
discriminating the two modes of FDI for tax purposes may not be feasible in practice.
Appendix
Table 5: Regional origin of acquirers
Country 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Austria 28 27 33 39 45 27 16
Australia 36 51 61 84 53 40 31
Belgium 45 46 68 46 42 31 34
Canada 170 169 154 157 137 104 164
Denmark 43 62 55 45 55 27 25
Finland 40 54 60 59 71 28 44
France 97 129 126 146 141 115 100
Germany 75 108 117 148 120 102 84
Ireland 46 40 42 81 31 18 21
Italy 19 29 40 38 39 19 19
Japan 24 36 32 33 33 26 28
Luxembourg 8 23 24 28 15 13 18
Netherlands 89 123 129 148 134 81 88
New Zealand 14 17 9 21 17 5 4
Norway 25 58 58 50 44 23 24
Spain 40 42 48 50 47 22 25
Sweden 66 100 103 138 103 72 80
Switzerland 56 66 67 75 91 60 44
United Kingdom 224 317 309 354 242 142 190
United States 450 514 524 521 448 318 451
all countries 1595 2011 2059 2261 1908 1273 1490
The table reports the number of cross-border M&As per country of
acquirer and year.
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Table 6: Variables
τi Corporate income tax rate of the candidate-country including average state
and municipal taxes, measured in percentage-points (0.01 = one%).
Used to compute T dummyij , T
∆
ij and T
∆2
ij .
Sources: Chennells and Griffith (1997), Eurostat (2004), and KPMG (2003).
IBFD (2010a). Previous issues of these publications were consulted as well.
τj Corporate income tax of the target-country including average state and mu-
nicipal taxes, measured in percentage-points (0.01 = one%).
Used to compute T dummyij , T
∆
ij and T
∆2
ij .
Sources: like τi
ωij Withholding tax rate applicable for dividends distributed from country j to a
parent located in country i.
Sources: Coopers & Lybrand (1998) and IBFD (2010a, 2010b). Previous issues
of these publications were consulted as well.
GDPCi Per capita gross domestic product in thousand dollars in the year before the
announcement date in the candidate-country converted to international dollar
using purchasing power parity rates.
Source: Worldbank (2010).
GDPGi Growth rate of gross domestic product of the candidate-country in the year of
the announcement date, measured in percentage-points.
Sources: Worldbank (2010) and OECD (2010), Aggregate National Accounts:
gross domestic product, OECD National Accounts Statistics (database) for
2010 data.
Stocki Share price times the number of shares outstanding of listed companies in the
candidate-country in the year before the announcement of the deal. Listed
domestic companies are the domestically incorporated companies listed on the
country's stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed companies do not
include investment companies, mutual funds, or other collective investment
vehicles. Measured in percentage of gross domestic product.
Source: Worldbank (2010).
Exchi Exchange rate in the candidate-country, national currency per U.S. dollar.
Sources: OECD (2010), OECD Economic Outlook No. 88, OECD Economic
Outlook: Statistics and Projections (database).
GDPSki Fraction of the target industry sector (first, second or third) in the gross do-
mestic product of the candidate country in the year before the announcement
date.
Source: Worldbank (2010), target sector taken from SIC-codes provided by
Zephyr.
to be continued on next page
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Table 6: (continued)
Dealski Number of deals in the industry of the target-company (first character of the
4-digit-sic-code) with acquirer-company in the candidate-country in the 5-year
period before the year of announcement of the deal.
Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk
Distij Logarithm of the simple distance between the most populated cities of the
candidate- and target-country in km.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005).
Neighbij Dummy variable, 1 for contiguity of candidate- and target-country.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005).
Langij Dummy variable, 1 for common official primary language in the candidate- and
target-country.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005).
Colonyij Dummy variable, 1 if candidate- and target-country pairs were ever in colonial
relationship.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005).
Sameij Dummy variable, 1 if candidate- and target-country were or are the same
country.
Source: Mayer and Zignago (2005).
Assetk Logarithm of pre-deal target total assets in thousand U.S. dollar in the last
available year before the acquisition announcement.
Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk.
Profk Pre-deal target profit after tax in thousand U.S. dollar in the last available year
before the announcement divided by pre-deal target total assets in thousand
U.S. dollar in the last available year before the acquisition announcement.
Source: Zephyr, Bureau van Dijk.
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Table 7: Summary statistics
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
T∆ij 240364 0.010 0.034 0 0.296
T∆ij (2008 tax rates) 240364 0.011 0.035 0 0.283
T∆ij (Profitk) 240364 0.003 0.019 0 0.296
T∆ij (Lossk) 240364 0.001 0.011 0 0.283
T∆2ij 240364 0.013 0.033 0 0.296
T∆3ij 240364 0.078 0.087 0 0.302
Withholdingij 240364 0.065 0.084 0 0.291
τi 240364 0.300 0.063 0.125 0.421
GDPCi 240364 35.406 9.437 24.291 74.422
GDPGi 240364 1.918 2.536 -8.019 6.474
Stocki 240364 95.906 57.375 13.474 323.710
Exchi 240364 7.237 23.558 0.500 117.755
GDPSki 240364 54.038 22.003 0.303 86.440
Dealski 240364 346.027 791.803 0 8184
Distij 240364 7.886 1.293 4.088 9.883
Neighbij 240364 0.113 0.317 0 1
Langij 240364 0.210 0.407 0 1
Colonyij 240364 0.099 0.298 0 1
Sameij 240364 0.010 0.100 0 1
Assetk 87890 9.288 2.125 0.693 20.483
Profk 87890 0.2100 18.275 -57.588 1236.621
For detailed variable descriptions and data sources, see Table 6.
Table 8: Regression results for the candidate-country fixed effects, column (3) of Table 2
Variable name Mean P-value mean Standard devia-
tion
P-value standard
deviation
AT -2.9562 0.000 -0.7881 0.043
AU -1.2810 0.000 -0.0516 0.831
BE -3.6807 0.000 1.4807 0.000
CA -1.6021 0.000 0.3481 0.258
CH -3.9036 0.000 1.8072 0.000
DE -1.6729 0.000 -1.1924 0.000
DK -1.8686 0.000 0.0114 0.978
ES -1.6131 0.000 0.2674 0.510
FI -2.3660 0.000 0.9586 0.000
FR -1.1623 0.001 -0.6353 0.084
UK -0.7475 0.003 -0.2658 0.089
IE -3.3576 0.000 -0.5147 0.136
IT -1.8188 0.000 -0.5780 0.093
JP -0.3221 0.674 -0.0621 0.888
LU -5.9488 0.000 -0.0881 0.916
NL -2.5249 0.000 -1.6621 0.000
NO -2.6500 0.000 -0.0983 0.763
NZ -2.0189 0.000 -0.2419 0.527
SE -1.2508 0.000 -0.1006 0.598
The table reports the means and standard deviations of the random coefficients of the potential acquirer
country dummy variables in regression (3) of Table 2. The U.S. represents the base category.
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Table 9: Regression results for candidate-country fixed effects and target-specific variables
Assetk and Profk, column (4) of Table 4
Variable name Coefficient P-value Standard devia-
tion
P-value standard
deviation
AT*Assetk 0.1711 0.001 - -
AU*Assetk 0.0409 0.521 - -
BE*Assetk -0.0367 0.499 - -
CA*Assetk 0.0250 0.601 - -
CH*Assetk 0.0808 0.157 - -
DE*Assetk 0.1030 0.037 - -
DK*Assetk -0.1309 0.003 - -
ES*Assetk 0.1503 0.000 - -
FI*Assetk -0.1651 0.001 - -
FR*Assetk 0.0587 0.069 - -
UK*Assetk -0.0125 0.650 - -
IE*Assetk 0.0358 0.547 - -
IT*Assetk 0.1760 0.000 - -
JP*Assetk 0.2013 0.001 - -
LU*Assetk 0.2995 0.000 - -
NL*Assetk 0.0875 0.013 - -
NO*Assetk -0.1162 0.013 - -
NZ*Assetk 0.0922 0.533 - -
SE*Assetk -0.0574 0.091 - -
AT*Profk 0.1800 0.521 - -
AU*Profk 0.2384 0.003 - -
BE*Profk 0.1109 0.501 - -
CA*Profk 0.0368 0.642 - -
CH*Profk 0.1944 0.381 - -
DE*Profk 0.2349 0.004 - -
DK*Profk 0.1378 0.293 - -
ES*Profk 0.0377 0.732 - -
FI*Profk 0.2374 0.003 - -
FR*Profk 0.1298 0.252 - -
UK*Profk 0.2402 0.002 - -
IE*Profk 0.2363 0.009 - -
IT*Profk -0.0641 0.165 - -
JP*Profk 0.0080 0.947 - -
LU*Profk 0.0946 0.749 - -
NL*Profk 0.1548 0.238 - -
NO*Profk 0.0894 0.454 - -
NZ*Profk 0.2383 0.008 - -
SE*Profk -0.0338 0.357 - -
to be continued on next page
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Table 9: Regression results for candidate-country fixed effects and target-specific variables
Assetk and Profk, column (4) of Table 4, continued
Variable name Mean P-value Standard devia-
tion
P-value Standard
deviation
AT -5.1742 0.000 1.2050 0.029
AU -2.4318 0.001 0.0211 0.978
BE -4.2108 0.0 00 -1.8320 0.000
CA -3.1148 0.000 1.3847 0.000
CH -6.2171 0.000 2.6419 0.000
DE -5.2168 0.000 2.8341 0.000
DK -0.9842 0.088 -0.1596 0.800
ES -3.5507 0.000 -0.3294 0.358
FI -1.6835 0.011 1.4481 0.000
FR -2.2515 0.000 -0.2669 0.595
UK -1.0358 0.032 -0.1062 0.679
IE -3.5946 0.000 0.2005 0.752
IT -4.0416 0.000 -0.4134 0.559
JP -4.3595 0.006 1.4957 0.002
LU -8.8030 0.000 -1.1255 0.129
NL -3.2028 0.000 1.1377 0.005
NO -1.4745 0.006 0.2611 0.492
NZ -4.4730 0.015 0.7336 0.487
SE -1.1132 0.033 0.3693 0.142
This table reports supplemental results of regression (4) in Table 4. The first part of the table lists the
coefficients (and corresponding p-values) of the target-specific variables Assetk and Profk interacted with
potential acquirer locations. The second part of the table reports the means and standard deviations
of the random coefficients of the potential acquirer country dummy variables and their corresponding
p-values. In all cases, the U.S. represents the base category.
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